After Theory

I’ve started reading Terry Eagleton’s After Theory. It’s quite enjoyable – less rigorous than Literary Theory – An Introduction (not surprising as it’s a different sort of book – he’s not obliged to summarise key thinkers one after the other) and more like a curmudgeonly rant, albeit a lucid, witty and ethical one.

What’s missing is his own biography (although he has written his memoirs elsewhere). It looms large in the background, but I want him to acknowledge it more – maybe he will later in the book. For example, when he says that cultural theory is “really a product of an extraordinary decade and a half, from about 1965 to 1980″ (pp. 23-24) and that “Not much that has been written since has matched the ambitiousness and originality of these founding mothers and fathers” (p. 1) he sounds a lot like those irritating baby boomers who drone on about how music was so much better in their day.

Recently I’ve been thinking a lot about the relationships between art, theory and politics, so I found the following passage interesting:

Marxism had been badly tarnished in the West by the monstrosities of Stalinism. But many felt that it had also been discredited by changes in capitalism itself. It seemed ill-adapted to a new kind of capitalist system which revolved on consumption rather than production, image rather than reality, the media rather than cotton mills. Above all, it seemed ill-adapted to affluence. The post-war economic boom may have been on its last legs by the 1960s, but it was still setting the political pace. Many of the problems which preoccupied militant students and radical theorists in the West were ones bred by progress, not poverty. They were problems of beaurocratic regulation, conspicuous consumption, sophisticated military hardware, technologies which seemed to be lurching out of control. The sense of a world which was claustrophobically coded, administered, shot through with signs and conventions from end to end, helped to give birth to structuralism, which investigates the hidden codes and conventions which produce human meaning. The 1960s were stifling as well as swinging. There were anxieties about packaged learning, advertising and the despotic power of the commodity. Some years later, the cultural theory which examined all this would itself be at risk of becoming one more glossy commodity, a way of touting one’s symbolic capital. These were all questions of culture, lived experience, utopian desire, the emotional and perceptual damage wrought by a two-dimensional society. They were not matters which Marxism traditionally had much to say about.

Pleasure, desire, art, language, the media, the body, gender, ethnicity: a single word to sum all these up would be culture. Culture, in a sense of the word which included Bill Wyman and fast food as well as Debussy and Dostoevsky, was what Marxism seemed to be lacking. And this is one reason why the dialogue with Marxism was pitched largely on that terrain. Culture was a way for the civilized, humanistic left to distance itself from the crass philistinism of actually existing socialism. Nor was it surprising that it was cultural theory, rather than politics, economics or orthodox philosophy, which took issue with Marxism in those turbulent years. Students of culture quite often tend to be politically radical, if not easily disciplined. Because subjects like literature and art history have no obvious material pay-off, they tend to attract those who look askance at capitalist notions of utility. The idea of doing something purely for the delight of it has always rattled the grey-bearded guardians of the state. Sheer pointlessness is a deeply disturbing affair.

In any case, art and literature encompass a great many ideas and experiences which are hard to reconcile with the present political set-up. They also raise questions of the quality of life in a world where experience itself seems brittle and degraded. How in such conditions can you produce worthwhile art in the first place? Would you not need to change society in order to flourish as an artist? Besides, those who deal with art speak the language of value rather than price. They deal with works whose depth and intensity show up the meagreness of everyday life in a market-obsessed society. They are also trained to imagine alternatives to the actual. Art encourages you to fantasize and desire. For all these reasons, it is easy to see why it is students of art or English rather than chemical engineering who tend to staff the barricades.

Students of chemical engineering, however, are in general better at getting out of bed than students of art and English. Some of the very qualities which attract cultural specialists to the political left are also the ones which make them hard to organize. They are the jokers in the political pack, reluctant joiners who tend to be more interested in utopia than trade unions. Unlike Oscar Wilde’s philistine, they know the value of everything and the price of nothing. You would not put Arthur Rimbaud on the sanitation committee. In the 1960s and 70s, this made cultural thinkers ideal candidates for being inside and outside Marxism simultaneously. In Britain, a prominent cultural theorist like Stuart Hall occupied this position for decades, before shifting decisively into the non-Marxist camp.

To be inside and outside a position at the same time – to occupy a territory while loitering sceptically on the boundary – is often where the most intensely creative ideas stem from. It is a resourceful place to be, if not always a painless one. One has only to think of the great names of twentieth-century English literature, almost all of whom moved between two or more national cultures. Later, this ambiguous position was to be inherited by the new ‘French’ cultural theorists. Not many of them were French in origin, and not many of those who were were heterosexual. Some hailed from Algeria, some from Bulgaria, and others from utopia. As the 1970s wore on, however, quite a few of these erstwhile radicals began to come in from the cold. The passage toward the depoliticized 80s and 90s had been opened.

Terry Eagleton, After Theory, pp. 38-40.

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2 comments to After Theory

  • This book is so relevant to my current interests. Sure, a lot of what he says is obvious (and I disagree with some of it) but I like the way he says it. He’s trying to create a ‘grand narrative’, which is a problematic exercise, and one which obviously displays his biases, but it’s still a fascinating and entertaining read. Here’s another excerpt:

    The period from 1965 to 1980 was by no means the first outbreak of revolutionary cultural ideas in twentieth-century Europe. For all its excitement, it pales to a shadow before the great current of modernism which swept the continent earlier in the century. If one wanted to select another, more distinguished decade-and-a-half which transformed European culture, one could do worse than choose 1910 to 1925. In this brief span of years, that culture was shattered and remade. It was the age of Proust, Joyce, Pound, Kafka, Rilke, Mann, Eliot, Futurism, Surrealism and a good deal more. As with the 1960s, it was also a time of tumultuous social change – though nothing in the later period compares to the scale of the wars, revolutions and social upheavals of the earlier. If the 1960s and 70s witnessed bouts of left-wing insurgency, the earlier period saw the birth of the first workers’ state in history. If the 1960s and 70s were an age of colonial revolutions, the years from 1910 to 1925 had at their centre the greatest imperialist conflagration which history had ever witnessed.

    Modernism reflected the crack-up of a whole civilization. All the beliefs which had served nineteenth-century middle-class society so splendidly – liberalism, democracy, individualism, scientific inquiry, historical progress, the sovereignty of reason – were now in crisis. There was a dramatic speed-up in technology, along with widespread political instability. It was becoming hard to believe that there was any innate order in the world. Instead, what order we discovered in the world was one we had put there ourselves. Realism in art, which had taken such an order for granted, began to buckle and implode. A cultural form which had been riding high since the Renaissance now seemed to be approaching exhaustion.

    In all these ways, modernism anticipated the later outbreak of cultural theory. In fact, cultural theory was among other things the continuation of modernism by other means. By about 1960, the great works of modernism had begun to lose much of their disturbing force. Joyce and Kafka were welcomed on to the university syllabuses, while modernist works of painting proved to be lucrative commodities with which no self-respecting corporation could dispense. The middle classes flocked to the concert halls to be archly scandalized by Schoenberg, while the stark, wasted figures of Beckett stalked the London stage. Brecht was de-alienated and a whole raft of fascist fellow-travellers politically sanitized. The outrageously experimental T.S. Eliot was awarded the presitgious Order of Merit. The dissident impulse behind the modernist movement still survived here and there, lingering on in late Surrealism and Situationism. But the movement as a whole had run out of subversive steam.

    That dissident impulse needed to migrate elsewhere; and cultural theory was one place where it set up home. Writers like Barthes, Foucault, Kristeva and Derrida were really late modernist artists who had taken to philosophy rather than to sculpture or the novel. They had a touch of the flair and iconoclastic force of the great modernist artists, as well as inheriting their intimidatory aura. The boundaries between the conceptual and the creative began to blur. This was one reason why less imaginatively endowed philosophers did not only denounce these thinkers; they failed to recognize what they were doing as philosophy at all. This was curious, since philosophy – to give the subject as rigourous a definition as possible – means speaking about certain things in certain ways. Time is a legitimate topic of philosophy, but Proust does not talk about it in the right way. Death is not in everyone’s view a valid philosophical concept, but if you discussed it in the language of Donald Davidson rather than Martin Heidegger, it might become so. Personal identity happens to be a pukka philosophical topic at present, but suffering is not quite so kosher. Besides, these French thinkers were clearly on the political left, whereas orthodox philosophers were not political at all. They were, in other words, conservative.

    Why then, had cultural theory ousted cultural practice? One answer is simply because cultural practice, in the shape of high-modernist art, already existed. Nothing ever happens twice, precisely because it has happened once already. The major art of twentieth-century Europe was the fruit of the first, traumatic impact on cultural life of the crisis of modern Western civilization. Once that impact had occurred, it was hard to feel it again in all its shocking immediacy. It is not easy to have the ground cut a second time from beneath one’s feet, unless one lives on the San Andreas fault. We became used to living with the loss of absolute value, along with the belief that progress was a myth, human reason an illusion and our existence a futile passion. We had grown accustomed to out angst, and had begun to hug our lack of chains.

    In any case, the full scandalousness of these ideas shows up only against the background of a traditional, relatively stable culture. That was a background which was perceptible in 1920, but fading rapidly by 1970. By the time postmodernism heaved over the horizon, there was little memory of such a context at all. As the pace of capitalist enterprise quickened, instability, disruption, perversity and sensationalism were now the order of the day. They were not particularly offensive, since there was no norm to measure them against. It was not as though they could be contrasted with the values of the family hearth. The hearth was the place where the family soaked up perversity, disruption and sensationalism on television. (pp. 63-66)

    and a couple of shorter excerpts:

    Today’s cultural theory is somewhat more modest. It dislikes the idea of depth, and is embarrassed by fundamentals. It shudders at the notion of the universal, and disapproves of ambitious overviews. By and large it can see such overviews only as oppressive. It believes in the local, the pragmatic, the particular. And in this devotion, ironically, it scarcely differs from the conservative scholarship it detests, which likewise believes only in what it can see and handle.

    There is, however, a much deeper irony. At just the point that we have begun to think small, history has begun to act big. ‘Act locally, think globally’ has become a familiar leftist slogan; but we live in a world where the political right acts globally and the postmodern left thinks locally. (p. 72)

    For some of its critics, the very idea of cultural theory is a contradiction in terms, rather like ‘fascist intellectual’ or ‘Alabaman haute cuisine’. The whole point of art and literature is their particularity. Works of art and culture are living experiences, not abstract doctrines. They are sensuous, delicate, uniquely individual. Don’t abstract ideas simply kill all this dead? [...]

    In fact, all talk about art is abstract. Cultural theory is not exceptional in this respect. [...]

    In any case, the assumption that all art is vividly particular is of fairly recent vintage. For all its love of the particular, this assumption oddly pretends to be a universal truth. (pp. 74-75)

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